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With recent privacy failures in the release of personal data, diﬀer-
ential privacy received considerable attention in the research com-
munity. This mathematical concept, despite its young age (Dwork
et al., 2006), has grabbed the attention of many researchers for its
robustness against identiﬁcation of individuals even in presence of
background information. Besides that, its ﬂexible deﬁnition makes
it compatible with diﬀerent data sources, data mining algorithms
and data release models. Its compositionality properties facilitate
design of “diﬀerential privacy aware” programming languages and
frameworks that empower non-experts to construct complex data
mining analyses with proven diﬀerential privacy guarantees. The
goal of this research is to introduce new (and improve the current)
diﬀerential privacy backed frameworks, prominent both in utility
and ﬂexibility of use. We study dynamic enforcement of diﬀerential
privacy both in the centralised model in which a trusted curator
process data stored in a centralised database and the local model
with no trust on the third party.
For the centralised model the thesis mostly focuses on the pri-
vacy impact of the basic building blocks used in these frameworks,
proving correctness of the system built upon them. With respect
to accuracy, we present “personalised diﬀerential privacy” as an
improved method of enforcing privacy that provides better data
utilisation and other beneﬁts. In this setting, individuals take con-
trol of their privacy requirements rather than being seen as a part
of a database. As a result, they can opt-in to a database with
their expected privacy level and optionally opt-out later. We fur-
ther study the privacy implication of other building blocks such as
diﬀerent kinds of sampling and partitioning.
For the local model we propose a general framework in which
the users can verify the recieved analyses and with a ﬂexible policy
express their privacy preference in diﬀerent forms such as enforcing
their personalised privacy budget.
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Introduction
Personal information is collected starting from morning; a transportation
record is stored in a database when you use your contact-less bus card.
Data is collected as the bus passes through mobile phone cells, when
you are busy checking your emails or when you interact with others via
social networks. Before you declare the time and your attendance in the
oﬃce using biometric methods, you might use your credit card to buy
a coﬀee from a shop protected by a CCTV camera. Diﬀerent kinds of
information are collected and stored in diﬀerent databases, possibly in
diﬀerent geographical locations. Some of this data is legitimately collected
to be used for strict and predeﬁned purposes. In the above scenario, your
salary or your transportation cost is calculated from the collected data.
Besides the desirable and legitimate processing of data, each service
provider involved in this scenario can beneﬁt from collected information
in diﬀerent ways. It is common for companies to use this data to learn
about their customers in order to predict their behaviours and improve
the service. As an example, the transportation company can change the
number of buses in diﬀerent areas, adjust the trip frequency according to
the time of day, or place more stations within areas with higher traveller
density.
Using personal data for such purposes seems not only benign but
also desirable; however, setting a proper border on how data should be
handled is a question that needs more scrutiny. Knowing that an analysis
is constructed from individuals’ personal information confronts us with
the crucial question: is it possible for someone to learn about an individual
by looking at the results of statistical analyses. Back to our example,
looking at the schedule and frequency of buses, can travel information of
an individual be inferred?
Even though the leakage in this speciﬁc case seems to be insigniﬁcant,
how can this leakage be quantiﬁed? What if one bus stop is only used by
one individual? While using the valuable information stored in a database
is tempting, this information has the most value for those who own it.
Any mistake or mishandling of these sensitive private data can easily
cause chaos.
2 Why Does Privacy Matter?
Investigating how much information can be extracted from the result
of a statistical analysis helps us to identify possible threats, and to provide
better assurance for users’ privacy.
1 Why Does Privacy Matter?
Our personal information is valuable, but privacy, like security, be-
comes an important issue when a breach occurs. Considering websites
and businesses that provide free services, solely by trading users’ personal
information, we see the immediate value that our personal information
has. Unfortunately, with the current state of Internet and society, where
people and Internet do not forget, the consequences of privacy violation
in the long term are not rectiﬁable.
No one can quantify the physical or emotional harm resulting from
a privacy breach since the type of possible harm, its duration and its
eﬀect on diﬀerent people is not completely known. Data revealed as a
result of a privacy breach may persist as long as the lifetime of its owner
or even longer in the case of Genomic data. This explains why possible
harm caused by privacy breaches should not be underestimated. While
eating habits and the amount of alcohol an individual consumes, may
be interesting for an advertising company, it is important to remember
that the advertisement companies are not the only people who can take
advantage of this information. This information can likewise be used in
the process of recruitment for your next job, to eﬀect the outcome of
university selection, or be used by health insurance companies.
Similarly, while the leakage of a database that keeps individual coﬀee
orders may at ﬁrst sound insigniﬁcant, it reveals the person’s location,
or in other words, his absence from his oﬃce during working hours. The
number of coﬀees that the person bought can reveal whether he was alone
or accompanied by another person. Presence of two persons in the coﬀee
shop at the same time may disclose an aﬀair, special communication or
friendship between them. Knowing the political orientation of one side
may reveal more about the purpose of the meeting. Progress in science
may reveal a pattern between coﬀee drinking and a mental/physical prob-
lem which gives new meanings and dimensions to this plain information
record. As it can be seen, any kind of information that individually looks
harmless can be abused if it is linked (possibly in the future) with mean-
ingful background information. The harm of a privacy violation may go
beyond the individual that is the subject to the privacy breach or even
beyond their lifetime. In 1951 after Henrietta Lacks died from aggres-
sive form of cervical cancer, her cells (also known as HeLa cells) were
cultivated in a laboratory. Progress in genome sequencing suddenly in-
troduced a new privacy threat to her family as HeLa cells’ genome was
published on Internet [40]. The genomes have much similarity with genes
that she passed on to her children and grandchildren living today. Hid-
Why Does Privacy Matter? 3
den in the sequence is potential biomedical information about Henrietta’s
descendants, such as their risk for getting Alzheimer’s disease or other
kinds of disorders. Recent studies [29, 28] have shown that social media
contents can be used to infer other information that are not voluntarily
expressed such as age, sex, political view, intelligence, sexual orientation
and preference.
Privacy is a broad topic; in this thesis we focus on privacy in statistical
databases. Since privacy is better understood when the violations are
investigated, in the next section we review some failures caused by careless
releases of databases.
Failures of Database Anonymisation If there is no privacy concern,
public interest encourages information disclosure as a way to learn more
about behaviours and common patterns. To achieve privacy, anonymisa-
tion (de-identiﬁcation) – that is the process of removing personally identi-
ﬁable information (PII) from raw data – is often used. A quasi-identiﬁer
is the unique key (such as social security number1) used to identify a
person in a database. While the idea of removing quasi-identiﬁers from
database for anonymisation seems to be promising, recent eﬀorts in data
anonymisation have ended up in scandals. In what follows list some of
the most well-known privacy failures of anonymisation eﬀorts is listed.
AOL Search Query Data Scandal When AOL released a huge dataset
of search queries belonging to 650,000 users, the company claimed that
they had applied anonymisation thoroughly as the IP addresses were
removed and user IDs were replaced with random numbers. The ran-
dom numbers avoid identiﬁcation of individuals while at the same time
allowing researchers to correlate diﬀerent search queries that belong to
individuals. While preliminary thought suggests that these data are ran-
dom terms issued by random people, looking at search queries one can
notice a person’s feelings and thoughts in diﬀerent social or emotional
conditions. Using these, it is possible to identify a person who wants to
commit suicide, someone who looks for a restaurant nearby and someone
looking for medication by searching symptoms.
These terms can easily reveal someone’s identity when a user searches
for a friend’s name, a nearby location or a rare disease. In these cases, the
searched terms can be linked together to single out and expose the faces
behind them [4]. Once the person is identiﬁed, her/his other queries can
reveal his/her deepest feelings, passions or secrets. To show the privacy
risk, the New York Times revealed the face behind the user No. 4417749
who searched for “numb ﬁngers”, “60 single men”, “homes sold in shadow
lake subdivision gwinnett county georgia” , “landscapers in Lilburn, Ga,”
and “dog that urinates on everything.”.
1 Similar to the personal number in Sweden
4 Why Does Privacy Matter?
Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission In another privacy
incident, the “Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission” released hos-
pital visit information for state employees after removing social security
numbers and addresses. William Weld, the Governor of Massachusetts
claimed that the anonymisation of the information protects the privacy of
patients. Sweeney [42] purchased the voter registration list for Cambridge
Massachusetts city and linked these two databases to ﬁnd the governor’s
health record. She narrowed down the possible records that may belong
to William Weld to three, using only birthday and gender. Finally, using
the ﬁve digits ZIP code, Weld’s medical record was uniquely identiﬁed
revealing information about his ethnicity, visit dates, diagnosis, proce-
dures, charges and medications. While name and social security number
are clearly considered the key to identify a person, Sweeney’s research
concluded that combination of ZIP code, birthday and sex can alterna-
tively be used to uniquely identify 87 percent of the population in the
US.
Netﬂix Competition The process of correlating and linking data to
individuals is surprisingly eﬀective knowing the person’s preferences or
interests. User preference, like ratings given to a movie, that has never
seriously been considered personally identiﬁable information, is shown
to be informative enough for re-identiﬁcation purposes. When Netﬂix
announced a prize for an alternative algorithm that can predict user
ratings for movies by mining current users’ ratings, a real dataset of
users’ ratings was provided to let the contesters train, test and measure
the quality of their algorithms.
The dataset had 100,480,507 ratings that 480,189 users gave to 17,770
movies. To anonymise the dataset, user IDs were replaced, some ratings
were randomly changed, added or deleted and some rating dates were
also modiﬁed. Even with this level of anonymisation, Narayanan and
Shmatikov [33] demonstrated that movie rental details (time and the
given rating) of three movies are enough to successfully link an individ-
ual to his records in the database. They compared the dataset against
publicly available IMDB ratings as the source of background information.
As a result of their research, one can conclude that the combination of
spatial and high dimensional attributes can make re-identiﬁcation easy.
As the result of these privacy scandals, AOL took down the user
search database several hours later. Under the pressures of a lawsuit
and Federal Trade Commission questioning, Netﬂix also decided to shut
down the contest. These countermeasures, as usual, were not eﬀective as
both databases have been mirrored immediately and distributed over the
Internet.
Background knowledge and cross-correlation with public databases is
a common way to re-identify individuals when obvious quasi-identiﬁers
are removed. Re-identiﬁcation is done when the result of linking our data
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with a background database leaves out few possible individuals for each
anonymised record. Sweeney [42] proposed the k-anonymity property for
the data. In k-anonymity the data provider (by manipulating data) en-
sures that each individual’s information is indistinguishable from at least
k − 1 other individuals present in the database. While it is not diﬃ-
cult to see why k-anonymity totally fails in high dimensional databases,
knowing possible attributes, even though not precisely, can still be in-
formative. As an example, a dataset that has 3-anonymity with respect
to the attribute disease may reveal that one person has HIV, syphilis
or chlamydia. K-anonymity also fails completely when the attacker is in
possession of additional knowledge. This background information can be
a database that is released with a k-anonymity guarantee which shows
k-anonymity does not compose with itself.
As explained earlier in this section, in non-interactive data disclo-
sure, sanitized data is released after applying some anonymisations (also
known as de-identiﬁcation) once and for all. Removing obvious identiﬁers,
sub-sampling and perturbing values are used to construct the “synthetic
data”. Unfortunately, the data released in non-interactive methods is only
suitable for the particular class of data analyses that it is released for.
In the next section, the possibility of a more ﬁne-grained data release
method, ﬂexible enough to be used in diﬀerent scenarios that supports
interactive systems, will be discussed.
2 Diﬀerential Privacy
The consequences of failures in anonymisation show the challenge of
statistical data disclosure. It seems the perfect privacy scenario from ev-
ery individual’s perspective is achieved when the individual opts-out from
the analysis and removes their record from the database. Privacy for ev-
eryone means that all records in the database have to be removed which
results in an empty database with no analysis. This is in line with an-
other expectation of privacy that the access to a database should not
reveal anything about an individual that cannot be gained without the
access. Dwork [8] shows the absolute disclosure prevention is impossible
in presence of auxiliary information that may be totally irrelevant to the
database. The impossibility result can be demonstrated with a simple
scenario. Assume the money that Zlatan Ibrahimović spent for alcohol in
last midsommarfest2 is considered to be secret. If auxiliary information
reveals that the money could feed 100 people in Fiji for a week, access
to the database of expenses in Fiji reveals the sum of the purchases, re-
gardless of Zlatan’s presence in that database. The fact that we cannot
protect his privacy is inevitable and leads to a new formulation of pri-
vacy known as diﬀerential privacy that makes no assumption about the
auxiliary information. This means even a computationally powerful ad-
2 midsommarfest is a Swedish celebration held to welcome summer
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versary that has information about all records in the database except the
target individual is not able to learn more from the individual beyond
the speciﬁed limit.
Other methods of anonymisation usually suﬀer from two problems.
The ﬁrst problem arises in corner cases in which a few individuals are ef-
fectively singled-out in analyses. As the number of individuals participat-
ing in an analysis decreases the eﬀect of each individual and subsequently
the information leak about those individuals increases. Each independent
analysis that is done independently leaks information too. One major dif-
ﬁculty is quantifying the information leakage for each analysis and the
total information leakage caused by composition of several analyses.
Having all this in mind, Dwork et al. [10] formulated diﬀerential pri-
vacy as indistinguishability of outcomes when an analysis is performed
on two similar databases. The hamming distance is commonly used as a
similarity measure for databases and closeness of probability of outcomes
measures the indistinguishability. A computation Q over these datasets
provides -diﬀerential privacy if it keeps the ratio of probabilities (A and
B as shown in Fig 1) of observing any outcome lower than e when it
runs on two neighbouring databases D and D′ (with hamming distance
1). More precisely the deﬁnition is:
Deﬁnition 1. A randomized function Q gives -diﬀerential privacy if for
all S ⊆ Range(Q) and all D and D′ where they are neighbours, we have:










Fig. 1. Outcome Probability
Properties As it can be realised from the deﬁnition, diﬀerential pri-
vacy is ﬂexible and not restricted to a database schema or the type of
output. The basic principles used to construct analyses over the Netﬂix
tabular database can be used to query more sophisticated data structures
like graphs used to represent interactions in social networks. Diﬀerential
privacy not only protects the value of data points but also protects the ex-
istence of individuals in a database. Imprecise responses give diﬀerential
privacy the desirable deniability feature even with possession of every-
one else’s personal information. Furthermore, diﬀerential privacy has a
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strong composition property that makes analysis construction from ba-
sic components possible. Something that is crucial for building tools and
frameworks.
The epsilon parameter () is a value to quantify the privacy loss or
harm. The privacy parameter has no unit but enables us to compare the
eﬀect and risk of two analyses on individuals’ privacy. Privacy is a fuzzy
concept and diﬀerent people put diﬀerent values to their personal data.
To understand the privacy risk better, consider the following scenario
inspired by [35]. Assume results from a medical survey aﬀects an insur-
ance company’s decision on the health insurance coverage. A change in
the insurance coverage from participation of other people in the study is
unavoidable; however, we expect that the cost (as a factor of risk) that
Alice pays for participation in the study does not exceed a certain limit.
Diﬀerential privacy can help us set these limits, pay compensation and
reward people for participation in surveys.
Mechanism Design Randomized response is a well-known method pro-
posed by Warner [48], later modiﬁed by Greenberg et al. [22], to give data
subjects privacy in the form of deniability. As pointed out by Dwork [8],
this mechanism provides diﬀerential privacy for answers given by partici-
pants in a survey. Suppose, for simplicity, that a yes-no question involves
an embarrassing answer. In this method, to respect people’s privacy, the
interviewer instructs people to ﬂip two coins secretly before responding
to yes/no questions. Each question should be answered “yes” if both coins
come up head, answered “no” if both coins come up tail. Otherwise the
question should be answered truthfully. Keeping the result of the coin
toss secret, only each person knows whether the answer reﬂects the re-
ality or the random coin ﬂip. The respondent can deny this answer by
claiming that the coin ﬂip was the reason for the response.
The analyst, knowing that each individual did this procedure before
responding to each question can conclude that roughly half of the ques-
tions are truthfully answered. From the other half, roughly half of them
(1/4 of the total responses) are “Yes” and 1/4 are “No” as a result of the
coin ﬂip. The ratio of answers determines a rough estimate of the overall
answers. One can further show that this procedure provides ln(3) diﬀer-
ential privacy.
Several more randomisation mechanisms are suggested such as lapla-
cian mechanism [10], exponential mechanism [30], geometric mechanism
[21] and stair case mechanism [20]. The laplacian noise provides real
values, for integer responses geometric mechanism introduced by Ghosh
et al. [21] and for queries that ask for a non-numerical value, like “what
is most common disease among database participants?”, the exponential
mechanism, developed by McSherry and Talwar [30] are applicable.
To use Laplace noise to make a noisy version of function f over a
dataset x, one only needs to know the sensitivity of the function, the
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maximum change in the result of the function when an item is added to
the dataset.
The noisy version of function f(x) that provides -diﬀerential privacy
is constructed by adding laplacian noise to the result of the function as
below:
f ′(x) = f(x) + Laplace(Sensitivity(f)/)
If f ′ is a randomised function constructed from the function f with sen-
sitivity of 1, Fig. 2 shows the probability density function in two neigh-

















P r[f ′(D) = x]
Pr[f ′(D′) = x]
Fig. 2. Probability Density Function
Composition Principle (Sequential) Diﬀerential privacy has useful
composition properties that make it possible to construct more complex
analyses using basic ones. If a family of queries Qi each give i diﬀerential
privacy, executing a sequence of the queries on the database gives
∑
i i-
diﬀerential privacy. This property, named sequential composition is the
key for building tools for doing diﬀerentially private analyses using basic
primitives. In the next section we introduce some of the well-known tools
in this area.
3 Variants of Diﬀerential Privacy
Apart from the standard and classic deﬁnition of diﬀerential privacy
(Deﬁnition 1), diﬀerent variants of diﬀerential privacy for diﬀerent set-
tings and purposes are proposed. In this section some of these variants
are explained.
Centralised and Local Model Trust plays an important role in the
perception of privacy. In the centralised model the users have to transmit
their data to the curator. Users have to trust the curator for the safe stor-
age of the data and correct usage of diﬀerential privacy. The centralised
model is not desirable for many users and therefore the local model is
seen as an important alternative. While the local model seems to be an
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obvious alternative, as shown by many studies, for the same level of pri-
vacy these algorithms do not perform as accurately as the centralised
model.
Bounded and Unbounded Two variants of diﬀerential privacy are
commonly used in the ﬁeld. Bounded diﬀerential privacy [27] deals with
the case in which neighbouring databases are constructed by changing
the value of one individual record in contrast with the unbounded def-
inition with two databases, one with an extra record. This restricts the
neighbouring databases to databases with the same size whereas the un-
bounded diﬀerential privacy can be deﬁned for databases with a variety
of sizes.
Weakening In (, δ)-diﬀerential privacy [9] (also known as approximate
diﬀerential privacy), , as before, represents the eﬀect one individual can
have on the information release and δ bounds the probability of a com-
plete privacy breach [41]. As a result, we make room for utility by allow-
ing privacy failure in low-probable events. The case δ = 0 (also known
as pure diﬀerential privacy) is equivalent of classic diﬀerential privacy as
explained before.
Generalising In 1970, Alan Westin conducted over 30 surveys about
the privacy concerns in diﬀerent areas. His report demonstrated that
people are categorized into three groups: Privacy Fundamentalists, Pri-
vacy Pragmatists and Privacy Unconcerned that motivates the need for
non-uniform privacy requirements for diﬀerent individuals and items in
a user proﬁle.
Recently, in three independent works [17, 26, 1], some eﬀorts have
been made to make diﬀerential privacy user centric. We discuss our pa-
per comprehensively in section 6.2 and here we only discuss the two
subsequent papers.
Having in mind that people have diﬀerent privacy preferences, Jor-
gensen et al. [26] proposed a personalised privacy method that can be
speciﬁed at the user level. They show that the proposed personalised
diﬀerential privacy framework has composition properties and a proce-
dure is provided to convert mechanisms from classic diﬀerential privacy
to their method. To summarize, the data is ﬁrst sampled non-uniformly
and then the right diﬀerentially private mechanism is applied. Individ-
ual tuples can have diﬀerent probabilities of being sampled depending on
their privacy preferences.
Even for diﬀerent parts of an individual data record, there may be
diﬀerent privacy preferences and expectations. This non-uniformity of
privacy preference brought the idea of heterogeneous diﬀerential privacy
[1]. In their generalisation of diﬀerential privacy, users describe their pri-
vacy expectations with a privacy vector. The privacy vector value for
each item ranges from zero for the absolute privacy to one for the stan-
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dard classic privacy. Later they describe the Stretching Mechanism that
changes the sensitivity of functions after applying the privacy vector.
Andrés et al. [2] introduce the notion of a geo-indistinguishability guar-
antee. Rather than completely hiding the user’s location, this notion of
privacy tries to hide locations with some level of approximation within
a radius r. While hamming distance is commonly used as a metric of
diﬀerence between two databases, to adopt distance to the location pri-
vacy setting Euclidean distance between locations is used. In addition, a
mechanism based on laplacian noise, that let users obtain needed service
even after randomised mechanism, is provided.
Diﬀerent Context Assumptions : Some other research focuses on
the usage of privacy in diﬀerent setting and special contexts. Pan Pri-
vacy [12] aims to retain the privacy of individuals in a data stream while
data is processed, with the assumption of an adversary that can observe
the internal state of the system at any unpredictable time. Dwork et al.
[11] consider a system in which the result of the same query changes
because of a change in the underlying database. This is a common situ-
ation for monitoring systems in which the system continuously produces
output (this may not be the case for Pan-Private systems). In this set-
ting neighbouring (adjacent) inputs should be deﬁned diﬀerently. In event
level privacy, two databases are neighbours when they diﬀer in one of the
events that belongs to a user, whereas in user level privacy the databases
may diﬀer in multiple events all belonging to one single user.
4 Scientiﬁc Methods and Goals
In the ﬁrst few sections we looked into importance of privacy, naive
deanonymisation techniques and scandals caused by them. In further sec-
tions we continued by introducing diﬀerential privacy as prominent notion
and studied its variants. We introduced few privacy enhancing tools and
regulatory requirements aiming to improve the current state of user pri-
vacy. Among these tools we are particularly interested in programming
language approaches that facilitate analysis construction as a program
and enforcing the diﬀerential privacy dynamically at runtime. We im-
prove these systems by 1) proposing a new privacy accounting schema
that permits users to announce their expectation of privacy 2) add new
functionalities and operations that are not necessary deterministic. 3)
Shifting the trust from the analyst, who performs the analyses, to data
owners.
To study and verify the correctness of these systems, we build mini-
malistic but formal models. These models allow us to abstract away from
details of implementation and to focus on fundamental components, their
behaviours individually and lastly their interactions with the rest of the
system.
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5 Diﬀerential Privacy, Tools and Methods
Data holders, eager to release information, are not usually privacy
experts. Going through diﬀerent formulas and computing the privacy cost
of an analysis is a quantiﬁed real-world problem. In addition, an analysis
can be arbitrarily complex. A data mining algorithm usually consists of
sub-analyses, few iterations and branches on an intermediate result. This
brings up the idea of using programming language techniques to ease
the construction of these analyses. As a result, many diﬀerential privacy
frameworks, methods and tools with variety of purposes are introduced.
In this section we look at some of them.
Privacy Integrated Queries PINQ [31] is a generic framework to con-
struct diﬀerentially private analyses for analysts that are unfamiliar with
diﬀerential privacy. All programs which are written in this framework
and use its APIs, automatically satisfy diﬀerential privacy. In PINQ, ev-
ery data source is wrapped in a PINQ (.NET) object. From this point,
the data can be only manipulated via a restricted API that only al-
lows aggregated results to be emitted to the analyst. These primitives
are divided into two major categories, transformations and aggregation.3
Input data is usually transformed before being used in an aggregation
function. Aggregation functions work on some speciﬁc types of input and
these transformations shape the input accordingly. Only stable transfor-
mations are allowed in this framework. The stability of a transformation
T is c if for any datasets A and A′ :
|T (A)⊕ T (A′)| ≤ c× |A⊕A′|
Some transformations are intrinsically stable like mapping a function
over records in a dataset, ﬁltering records based on a predicate, and
grouping records into limited groups that share a property. In unstable
transformations small diﬀerences between neighbouring datasets (when a
dataset contains an individual’s records and when it does not) may lead
to unbounded diﬀerence in the resulting datasets. To deal with unstable
behaviour of operators like join, PINQ introduces a restricted variant
with similar behaviour.
When data is selected and formed for a statistical analysis, an ag-
gregation operation (like Count, Sum, Average, Median, Min, Max) is
executed on it. The result of these aggregation operations are allowed
to be emitted to the analyst. Aggregations in PINQ use the laplacian
mechanism to add the needed amount of noise. Composition of a c-stable
transformation with an -diﬀerential privacy query results in a computa-
tion with higher sensitivity that gives (c×)-diﬀerential privacy. Function
sensitivity is a numerical value that measures the maximum order of mag-
3 PINQ has a modular structure and can be extended with new primitives
(transformations or aggregations).
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niﬁcation in distance as a result of applying the function to similar inputs.
Low sensitive functions maps nearby inputs to the nearby outputs.
As mentioned before, diﬀerential privacy is compositional and queries
can always be composed sequentially. In order to improve utilisation and
reduce the privacy cost of analyses, parallel queries are introduced. Paral-
lel queries are executed on disjoint subsets of records and provide a better
lower bound on the privacy guarantee. Assume any arbitrary n queries,
Qi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n) that each provide i-diﬀerential privacy in isolation. If
these queries are executed on n disjoint subsets of data, the lower bound
for total privacy cost decreases from
∑
1≤i≤n i to max(1 . . . n). Parallel
queries are especially useful for building histograms in which data points
are grouped based on one of the attributes.
wPINQ [37] is a generalisation of PINQ to weighted datasets, capable
of answering a larger class of queries like analyses on graphs. Since the
amount of noise is signiﬁcant, considering the fact that the input dataset
is not usually the worst case, wPINQ assigns real valued weights to indi-
viduals and scales down the contribution of problematic individuals. This
avoids high noise magnitude that is added as the result of applying high
sensitive functions.
Airavat [39] is the integration of Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
to diﬀerential privacy in order to provide conﬁdentiality, integrity and
privacy on large scale distributed cloud computing. Airavat prevents in-
formation leakage by using SELinux-like mandatory access control on
the ﬁle system, modifying Java virtual machine and enforce diﬀerential
privacy on its Map-Reduce framework.
Fuzz, DFuzz, Adaptive Fuzz [23, 38, 50] presents a typed functional
programming language with a type system equipped with extra metrics
to track function sensitivity to ﬁnd the right amount of noise needed to
guarantee diﬀerential privacy. Dfuzz [38] introduces dependent types as
an extension to Fuzz, allowing a larger class of analyses; among them are
analyses that need runtime information.
Fuzz also introduces some practical attacks using time and state side
channels. Some precautions are introduced in PINQ to examine and
rewrite methods that leak information via side channels. Despite their
eﬀorts, Fuzz exhibited their ineﬀectiveness. An analysis that observes an
embarrassing record can run sub queries to use up the entire privacy
budget. The exception caused by lack of budget can reveal the existence
of the target record. The type system in this functional language infers
the privacy cost statically which closes the privacy budget side chan-
nel. More importantly they introduced predictable transactions (micro
queries) that process a single record in the ﬁxed amount of time. They
proved that the timing channel can be ruled out by aborting the micro
query and replacing the result with a default value provided by the user.
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Finally, they proposed network communication to separate the anal-
yser and the machine running the query in order to eliminate electromag-
netic radiation, power consumption and cache base side channels.
Relational Algebra [SQL] Relational algebra is commonly used as a
theoretical foundation of query languages (like SQL) used to query re-
lational databases. Palamidessi and Stronati [36] analysed and assigned
tight sensitivity bounds to relational algebra operators and introduced
composition rules that determine how sensitivity of a query can be com-
puted from the sensitivity of the relational operator that has constructed
it.
FLEX [25] is a practical tool for enforcing diﬀerential privacy for real
world SQL queries based on elastic sensitivity. The elastic sensitivity is
an upper bound on local sensitivity computed from the database metrics
and the query structure.
GUPT [32] Noise magnitude can be adapted by considering the database
that the query runs over rather than just the function logic that oper-
ates on it. This is achievable, as Nissim et al. [34] stated, by deﬁning
smooth sensitivity that represents the variability of a function in the
neighbourhood of a particular instance of the database. This is challeng-
ing as the noise magnitude may leak information about the content of
database and the accuracy of answers depends on the content of dataset.
GUPT is a system that demonstrates this instance-based additive noise
method. Computing or approximating smooth sensitivity might be diﬃ-
cult. GUPT uses a sample and aggregate framework to tackle this prob-
lem. This method can be automated and is applicable for an interactive
model in which the function is given as a black-box.
IO Automata Tschantz et al. [47] introduce a formal probabilistic IO
automaton model for diﬀerential privacy analyses. They use probabilistic
bisimulation techniques to verify diﬀerential privacy of an interactive sys-
tem inspired by PINQ. In addition to the proof technique, they show how
bounded memory of their system causes increase in the privacy leakage
bound.
CertiPriv Barthe et al. [5] introduce the CertiPriv framework that
assists deriving the diﬀerential privacy guarantee provided by a program
using Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic. It is built on top of Coq proof
assistant [46] and is capable of reasoning about approximate diﬀerential
privacy. The method is powerful enough to build proofs of diﬀerential
privacy for non-trivial mechanisms. Finally, they illustrate the generality
of their approach by providing a correctness proof for several diﬀerential
privacy mechanisms and algorithms.
RAPPOR [19] One real world tool that uses diﬀerential privacy is
Google Chrome that anonymises users’ browser preferences before send-
ing reports to Google servers. Building on top of randomized responses,
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RAPPOR sends software reports that look like random data, but can
eventually in aggregation, be used to extract useful information. The
generated report is only usable to gain statistical information about a
user’s client software setting without the possibility of inferring the exact
user preferences.
Using primitive principles of diﬀerential privacy, it is easy to see how
anonymisation of one single bit of response is applicable for anonymising
bit strings. Taking the advantages of this, numerical or ordinal values can
be represented by predicates on diﬀerent ranges. A novel method of this
system is the use of bloom ﬁlters to randomize non-categorical domains,
like an arbitrary set of strings in a diﬀerentially private manner.
PROCHLO [6] is the implementation of the ESA (Encode, Shuﬄe,
Analyze) architecture. The encoding is performed locally to transform,
fragment and apply random noise to users’ data. The shuﬄer strips meta-
data such as IP addresses, timestamps and further uses sampling and
reordering of items to de-associate users from reports. Eventually the
analyser decodes, aggregates and ﬁnally publishes the result.
DPCOMP [24] is a tool that allows researchers to evaluate diﬀerent al-
gorithms on a collection of datasets. Diﬀerent factors that are inﬂuencing
the performance of these algorithms are varied to measure their impacts
on the accuracy and utility of the results.
Apple iOS 10 Apple introduced usage of diﬀerential privacy in their
10th edition of their operating system (iOS 10) in 2017 [3]. Several patents
[44, 45] are registered explaining the details of the algorithms.
6 Contributions
This thesis comprises ﬁve papers, “Featherweight PINQ” [15], “Dif-
ferential Privacy, now it is getting personal ” [17], “Sampling and Parti-
tioning for Diﬀerential Privacy” [18], “PreTPost: A Transparent, User
Veriﬁable, Local Diﬀerential Privacy Framework ” [16], “Design and Use
of PreTPost Framework ” [13].
Paper I, “Featherweight PINQ” published in the Journal of Privacy
and Conﬁdentiality, tries to ﬁll the gap between the basic idea of dif-
ferential privacy and PINQ, the standard and generic framework that
implements diﬀerential privacy.
Many diﬀerential privacy frameworks share the same principles as
PINQ. Looking closely at PINQ, one can see some of its deviations from
the standard deﬁnition of diﬀerential privacy. We take a look at the con-
cept of privacy budget and how PINQ dynamically enforces it, parallel
queries, strategies and the program reﬂections upon query response. We
present Featherweight PINQ, a simpliﬁed formal model of PINQ, that
explains how PINQ works and proves correctness of the system.
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Paper II, “Personalised Diﬀerential Privacy, now it is getting per-
sonal ”, is published in POPL4 2015. The paper tries to improve the bud-
get book-keeping system that is used to dynamically enforce -diﬀerential
privacy. In this novel method, rather than specifying a global privacy
budget for a database, budget assignment is done on user level, hence
personalised. Provenance tracking is used to compute the eﬀect of query
execution on an individual’s budget. We model provenance tracking used
in this method and show how this method reduces the privacy cost of
analyses.
Paper III, Sampling and Partitioning for Diﬀerential Privacy, pub-
lished in the fourteenth annual conference on “Privacy, Security and Trust
2016”, looks into to two important basic blocks for constructing a diﬀer-
entially private analysis and their composition principles with existing
blocks by introducing a new concept called probabilistic stability.
Paper IV, “PreTPost: A Transparent, User Veriﬁable, Local Diﬀeren-
tial Privacy Framework ”, shifts the perspective from a centralised setting
to local diﬀerential privacy.
Finally the paper V, “Design and Use of PreTPost Framework ”, dives
into practical aspects of using the PreTPost framework and the design
decisions that are made to serve the framework’s requirements.
In the remainder of this section we provide a more in-depth summary
of these papers. Papers 1-3 are previously published and presented here
unchanged modulo minor typographic corrections and reformatting to ﬁt
the style of the thesis.
6.1 Paper I : Featherweight PINQ
PINQ (Privacy Integrated Queries) [31], is one of the well-known tools for
constructing diﬀerential privacy analyses. PINQ, like LINQ5, brings the
support for various data sources (e.g. DryadLINQ) and usage of general-
purpose programming languages to write programs. These features make
PINQ an appealing choice for analysers to construct programs that au-
tomatically enforce a certain level of diﬀerential privacy. The simplicity
and extensibility of PINQ empowers experts to introduce variants of dif-
ferential private frameworks. Among the frameworks that root in PINQ
we can list wPINQ [37] for weighted datasets, Streaming-PINQ [49] for
streaming algorithms and our tool ProPer for personalised diﬀerential
privacy (introduced in Paper II).
Many articles have already discussed the theory, compositionality
properties and the design of diﬀerentially private operations. However,
formal veriﬁcation of an implemented system, like PINQ, requires com-
bining all these blocks and has not been the subject of any of those
4 42nd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages
5 Language-Integrated Query integrates query capabilities into the C# lan-
guage.
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studies. In addition, PINQ varies from diﬀerential privacy theories by
introducing some extra features, the correctness of which have not been
thoroughly investigated. In what follows we introduce the three aspects
that PINQ handles but which have not been precisely introduced by the
theory.
Partitioning Transformation PINQ introduces parallel queries by
partitioning an input dataset into disjoint subsets. As a result, a par-
allel query enjoys the maximum of privacy guarantees of all sub-queries,
which is lower than the sum of them. This can be explained as one in-
dividual from input dataset cannot be present in two disjoint partitions
and a query on one partition does not reveal anything about other in-
dividuals that are present in the other partitions. This is not correct as
the partitioning may also be done in an intermediate dataset rather than
the input dataset. Information deriving from one individual may end up
in two partitions, since an intermediate dataset may contain two records
deriving from one individual.
Strategy for Sequential Queries A diﬀerential private program in
this framework may inspect the result from one query and determine the
parameters of the next query.
Privacy Budget PINQ dynamically enforces a privacy budget for analyses
over a sensitive dataset by blocking any query that tries to over-consume
the limited privacy budget. The theory only discusses the measuring of
privacy cost, whereas PINQ enforces this privacy budget by throwing an
exception when the budget is fully exhausted. Observing such behaviour
may, in principle, be informative and leak information.
In Paper I, “Featherweight PINQ”, we start by introducing the ba-
sic foundation of diﬀerential privacy that PINQ is based upon, such as
-diﬀerentially aggregation operations, stable transformations and their
composition with these aggregation operations to construct a query. Then
we see how multiple queries are composed (sequential and parallel) and
how it aﬀects the overall privacy guarantee that the system promises.
Finally, we analyse the gap between the theory and PINQ introduced as
a result of:
– dynamically enforcing a certain level of privacy rather than measuring
it
– inadequate modelling of adeptness of sequential and parallel queries
– execution of parallel queries on an intermediate table constructed as
a result of table transformation
We present a model that simpliﬁes the system in one important as-
pect, queries that set up a parallel query should be all present in the
system on query execution time. To prove diﬀerential privacy of Feath-
erweight PINQ, we introduce a probabilistic trace semantic. Using the
Contributions 17
model and the trace semantics, we prove that any client program con-
structed in Featherweight PINQ yields a system satisfying diﬀerential pri-
vacy. Finally, we suggest two additional safe APIs that allow programs to
read the global privacy budget value and the scaling factors for protected
tables.
6.2 Paper II : Diﬀerential Privacy, Now it is Getting Personal
An important challenge is to improve analyses to gain more information
without endangering an individual’s information. However, much of the
research up to now has tended to focus on improving mechanisms or
speciﬁc algorithms rather than monitoring what parts of a database are
leaked. If an analyst asks about the average salary of men, no information
about women in the database is leaked.
Paper II tries to resolves these issues by introducing a new budget
book-keeping method. In this setting each individual has a personalised
privacy budget. Unlike PINQ in which the sensitivity of a function deter-
mines the multiplier of budget reduction from the global privacy budget,
in the personalised setting the number of records derived from an indi-
vidual participating in an analysis determines the multiplier of reduction
from this personalised privacy budget. To keep track of records derived
from one individual record we use a notion similar to why provenance in
the terminology of [7]. The signiﬁcance of the method can be highlighted
in the following three points.
Eﬃcient Budget Consumption Parallel queries are introduced in
PINQ to reduce the cost of queries on global budget, but constructing
parallel queries is cumbersome, because it requires presence of all queries
on diﬀerent partitions at the query execution time. Without the presence
of all queries, ﬁnding a set of queries that optimises budget cost is not
easy. In many cases the immediate answer is needed or there is some
dependency between queries.
Good utility is one beneﬁt that is gained from our personalised budget
book-keeping technique. Unlike the classic model of budgeting, in which
parallel queries play an important role for gaining proper utilization, this
method does not rely on parallel queries since the system inherently en-
joys eﬃcient budget consumption. This approach also avoids many of the
problems (mentioned in the previous section) in modelling parallel queries
and designing parallel version of analyses. Assigning -personalized pri-
vacy budget to all individuals guarantees -diﬀerential privacy in the
classic model.
Stream Data An added beneﬁt of a personalised budget is in dynamic
databases. In a dynamic setting, records may be added or removed from a
working dataset continuously. Assigning one global privacy budget, that
is decreased as queries are executed, implies that updating the entire
database with fresh records does not aﬀect the budget. This is unfortu-
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nate since nothing has been leaked about these recent records and one
may expect a non-zero privacy budget.
If a privacy budget is assigned to an individual’s record when it is
added to the dataset and the record can actively participate in analyses
until its budget is exhausted, this model of budgeting seems to perfectly
ﬁt the requirements of stream databases. We show that our system is ca-
pable of answering continuous queries when the data-stream is refreshing
the database at a certain rate.
Limitation and Disadvantages Behaviour of the system in corner
cases in which particular records participate in more analyses is a contro-
versial case. PINQ blocks a query at the execution time when the global
privacy budget is exhausted and this behaviour of PINQ is shown not
to leak information. In contrast, the same behaviour in the personalised
setting shows the presence of individuals and is considered extremely
informative. As an example, if the system blocks a query that inten-
tionally targeted one individual, this clearly indicates that the individ-
ual is present in the database. Therefore, this method excludes records
that are derived from individuals who do not have a suﬃcient budget to
participate in analyses. Although this makes reasoning about utilization
diﬃcult, an analyser with some background information can choose and
arrange queries in such a way that error from the absence of depleted
records has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the result.
We present our system, named ProPer (Provenance for Personalised
Diﬀerential Privacy) that is modelled using a similar trace semantics as
explained in Paper II with provenance tracking to ﬁnd track records that
are derived from individuals in the input dataset.
Provenance tracking adds overhead to transformation and query ex-
ecution but comparing execution time of some analyses written in both
PINQ and ProPer we demonstrate that the runtime overhead of prove-
nance tracking is modest.
6.3 Paper III : Sampling and Partitioning for Diﬀerential
Privacy
This paper studies sampling and partitioning methods and their eﬀect on
diﬀerential privacy in the unbounded diﬀerential privacy. We demonstrate
a practical attack on PINQ’s deterministic sampling transformation. The
attack gives an example of when sampling has a negative eﬀect on the
diﬀerential privacy cost of an analysis compared to the case without sam-
pling.
Furthermore, we investigated other sampling and partitioning meth-
ods, especially those that use randomness in their selection and compare
them with their deterministic alternatives. To compare and use our re-
sult in diﬀerential private frameworks such as PINQ, we introduce the
concept of probabilistic stability that generalises stability.
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We made the interesting observation that only Bernoulli sampling
boosts privacy and the partitioning method based on Bernoulli sampling
has the same eﬀect as the deterministic parallel composition.
6.4 Paper IV : PreTPost: A Transparent, User Veriﬁable,
Local Diﬀerential Privacy Framework
Trust is an important factor in the privacy discussions. In all the previous
papers, a trusted party possesses all the data and an analyst or a pro-
tection mechanism is responsible to ensure the correct anonymisation of
the results. This model, commonly referred to as the centralised model,
additionally requires conﬁdentiality for data transformation and security
for data storage from both internal and external attackers while the data
is stored in the database. Many people do not trust the data curator or
see the risk of failure as not acceptable.
The recent adaptation of a local model in the Chrome web browser
[19] and the iOS operation system [3] seems to be a step forward toward
respecting users’ privacy but lack of transparency puts all the eﬀorts in
the question. Tang et al. [43] show that the implementation is promis-
cuous in the choice of the privacy parameter epsilon. Analyses in these
systems are either hard-coded in the system or should be communicated
to the users. Hard-coded analysis reduces the ﬂexibility while dynamic
analysis may endanger the security and conﬁdentiality of the user data.
The analysis that is sent and executed on user data may introduce new
security and privacy concerns and makes the need for transparency in the
design more severe. These shortcomings bring the idea of a framework
with dynamic analysis with transparent design in which the users verify
the diﬀerential privacy of an analysis themselves with no need to trust
the curator.
Pre-processing of the private data in the centralised model requires a
complex sensitivity analysis of the algorithm. The post-processing that
is common between the local and the centralised setting with the pre-
processing theorems in the local model are simple but important funda-
mental concepts that the PreTPost framework is built upon.
The decomposition of analyses into Pre, T and Post components and
restricting their communication simpliﬁes their isolation and helps the
system to block the leakage of information from timing and other types
of side channels.
The usefulness of the system is demonstrated by integrating existing
local diﬀerential privacy algorithms in the PreTPost framework. Addi-
tionally, one speciﬁc algorithm that is a core to several other algorithms
is studied in detail to explain the decomposition technique.
6.5 Paper V : Design and Use of PreTPost Framework
Last section is a tutorial paper that discussed the use and the design
of the PreTPost framework. The PreTPost tries to push back the trust
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from the analyst who performs analyses to the transparent system that
execute the analyses. Therefore, knowing the structure, architecture and
the decisions that are made during the design and implementation of the
PreTPost framework is important.
Local model tries to minimize the data storage in the curator side
therefore the steady communication between users and the curator is
important. We see how users can encode their privacy preference as a
policy and how the curator and user agree on utility and privacy.
Additionally, we show how the framework can be deployed in a real
scenario. We use a scenario of a Internet Service Provider (ISP) who
is interested to learn about its client by querying their home routers. In
these examples we demonstrate the decomposition of an analysis into pre-
processing, randomised transformation and post-processing and present
code samples for constructing a query and transmitting it to users.
Finally, we investigate threats from a malicious curator who is try-
ing to extract user’s information through unconventional methods. The
pre/post processing functions can be a binary executable that may po-
tentially be malicious. We look into the required isolation and sandboxing
of diﬀerent components of the system and how the system overcomes the
information leakage through side channels (e.g. timing channel).
6.6 Personal Contributions
“Featherweight PINQ” [15] is the simple model we provided for PINQ.
The proof of diﬀerential privacy for Featherweight PINQ was done by me
and the development of the idea and system modelling was jointly done
with David Sands.
During my master thesis project, I came up with the idea of a person-
alised budget and implemented a tool named PINQuin [14] to demon-
strate it. ProPer (the implementation of which has some minor diﬀerences
with the original idea of PINQuin) is a powerful model for a system that
does provenance tracking in order to dynamically determine who and how
much to subtract from the personalised budget. Details of this method
are articulated in Diﬀerential Privacy, Now it is Getting Personal [17].
Modelling and the proof of ProPer were jointly done with David Sands
with the help and contribution of Gerardo Schneider.
The idea for the article “Sampling and Partitioning for Diﬀerential
Privacy” [18] came up when I noticed a problem in the PINQ’s Take()
and Skip() methods. The proof was developed by me, corrected and
improved by David Sands and Thibaud Antignac.
The paper “PreTPost: A Transparent, User Veriﬁable, Local Diﬀer-
ential Privacy Framework ” [16] describes the framework that is devel-
oped after similarities between local diﬀerential privacy algorithms are
observed and it was decided to unify them in one single framework. The
algorithm’s integration into the framework by their decomposition into
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Pre,T,Post components and the idea of pre-processing theorem were done
by me.
Finally I contributed to at least 50% of writing task for each paper
except the paper “Design and Use of PreTPost Framework ” [13] that is
fully done by myself.
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